Transition countries have, in general, experienced an increase in labour market inequality during and after the initial transition period. Theory and empirical studies analysing the causes and mechanisms of increasing inequality in transition economies identify globalisation, skilled-biased technological change, differences in access to schooling, the pattern and level of unemployment and institutions as important factors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased significantly in transition economies during the transition period and has been considered to be an important channel for the diffusion of new technology, managerial skills and new knowledge. As a result of technological and management expertise FDI may raise the level of wages in the host economies, improve working conditions and increase employment, though little previous research has focused on these effects in transition economies. Using the GINI coefficient as the measure of wage inequality a simulation analysis indicates that the net effects of FDI on wage inequality will depend in part on country specific factors, namely how large are the differences in skilled and unskilled wages, the skillintensity of employment in foreign-owned firms compared to domestic ones and the relative size of the foreign-owned sector.
Introduction
The rapid growth of FDI, mainly since the1990s, is one of the reasons why the study of FDI is an important issue and has motivated scholars to develop a number of theories and empirical evidence to explain the causes, patterns and effects of FDI. This sharp increase in FDI flows has raised, among other issues, a debate about its effects on labour market inequality. It has been widely argued, both in the theoretical and empirical literature, that FDI brings host countries net additional capital, technology transfer, new jobs, increased management expertise, improving infrastructure and an improvement in the general business climate (Kinoshita and Campos, 2004; Serbu, 2005; . The key factors attracting inwards FDI in transition economies have been identified as gravity factors, unit labour costs, agglomeration, trade openness, the level of institutional development, legal framework and political risk (Holland and Pain, 1998; Garibaldi et al., 2001 ; Bevan and Estrin, 2004 ; Kinoshita and Campos, 2004) .
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FDI has been considered an important factor for the reintegration of the economies in transition into the world economy because, unlike trade, it is a long-term transaction and foreign-owned firms account for almost two-thirds of word trade (Kolotay, 2010) .
That inwards FDI plays an important role in growth and development is uncontested, however, the impact of FDI on inequality not only remains controversial, but, has not received the same attention, particularly from scholars of transition economies (Kaltani, 2007) . Studies investigating the relationship between foreign direct investment and inequality typically attribute part of the increase in income inequality to increased inwards FDI in host countries (Vijaya and Kaltani, 2007) . Using evidence from previous studies and descriptive analysis, this paper aims to introduce the discussion of the impact of FDI on labour market inequality. This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 FDI inflows into transition economies are examined and the pattern of these flows by sector and region analysed. In Section 3 we discuss the relationship between FDI and labour market inequality. This section further analyses the impact of FDI on the level and pattern of employment and wages. In addition, this section presents a simulation analysis on the effects of a growth in foreign ownership on wage inequality in host countries, using the Gini coefficient as a measure of wage inequality. The last section presents concluding remarks on the importance of FDI on labour market inequality.
FDI inflows into transition economies
The importance of FDI in transition economies and in the world economy has increased rapidly during recent decades. FDI has become a key element in global economic development and integration and an important element of the national development strategies of most transition countries (UNCTAD, 2003) . Inwards FDI has increased significantly in transition economies during the last twenty-five years. As explained in the previous studies, it has been identified as a potentially important factor in explaining increases in labour market inequality. This investment has been mainly in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and less in new assets ('green field'), with FDI inflows being particularly stimulated by the privatisation of public enterprises in transition countries (UNCTAD, 2006) . This section discusses FDI inflows into transition economies and the pattern of these flows by region and sector. Global inflows are expected to reach more than $1.9 trillion in 2014, barring any macroeconomic collapse, and developing and transition economies were expected to remain a favourable destination for FDI (UNCTAD, 2012). In 2012, FDI inflows in the transition economies of South-East Europe almost halved as a result of decreased investment from EU countries who are the main investors in this sub-region. In the CIS countries, FDI inflows declined slightly as foreign investors were attracted by these countries' fast-growing consumer markets and plentiful natural resources (UNCTAD, 2013). The decline of FDI in transition countries in 2012 was, in part, due to a slump in cross-border M&A sales (UNCTAD, 2013). The uneven distribution of inwards FDI across transition countries has been noted (Kolotay, 2010) and the large differences in cumulative inflows are shown in Table 1 . Very large inflows have been attracted by the larger economies, such as Russia and Poland ($418,982 million and $ 180,836 million in 1995-2012, respectively). Whereas, tiny inflows, less than $6 million over the period 1995 to 2012, characterize some low and middle-income economies such as Armenia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2012, FDI inflows were concentrated in a few economies, with the top three countries (Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) accounting for 84% of the sub-region's total inflows (UNCTAD, 2013). Even though FDI inflows to Russia declined by 7% compared to the previous year, they remained high at $ 51 billion. Foreign investors in this case were motivated by the growing domestic market due to reinvestments in the automotive and financial industries (UNCTAD, 2013). Figure 2 suggest that the inward FDI stock as percentage of GDP played a more important role in Montenegro, Bulgaria and Serbia, representing on average 68% of their GDP. The contribution of FDI to financial accumulation has been particularly important for economies in transition given the resource intensity of transformation and the scale of required structural changes (Kolotay, 2010) . This role of FDI in financial accumulation is proxied by its ratio to gross fixed capital formation ( Figure 3 ). The ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation has tended to be higher in transition economies than the 166 AcAdeMicuS -internAtionAl Scientific JournAl world average and has increased over time (Kolotay, 2010) . As illustrated in Figure 3 , the transition economies of South-East Europe have relied more on FDI in their capital accumulation (17.8% average of 1995-2012) compared to CIS countries, where this comparable figure is 13.2%. FDI inflows partly depended on the extent, form and timing of the privatization of the public enterprises in transition countries, this investment was mainly in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and less in the form of new assets (Tables 3 and 4 Countries with the largest foreign direct investments in Republic of Macedonia from 1997 to 2008 are Greece, the Netherlands and Hungary (UNCTAD, 2012). However, these statistics on the origin of FDI need to be treated with caution since in some cases the nationality of the immediate and final investor may differ. For example, the state-owned telecommunication company was acquired by the Hungarian company Magyar Telecom, but this company itself belongs to the German Deutsche Telecom Group (UNCTAD, 2012).
In Macedonia, foreign-owned firms trade more than their domestic counterparts. They export about 60% of their output, whereas domestic-owned firms about 40% (UNCTAD, 2012). Foreign-owned companies in Macedonia have enhanced the provision of services, such as telecommunications and banking, introduced new technologies and machineries, improved export capacities through contract manufacturing and paid higher wages than domestic-owned companies (UNCTAD, 2012).
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To conclude, FDI inflows have been important resources during the transition process, though its degree of importance differs across countries. The share of FDI inflows to gross fixed capital formation was high in countries that based their development strategy on FDI, whereas it was low in countries that neglected inward FDI in their development strategy (Kolotay, 2010) .
FDI and labour market inequality
The effects of FDI flows on economic growth and its determinants have been studied in both the theoretical and empirical literature, however the effects of these flows on labour market inequality in transition countries has largely been neglected. This section aims to introduce FDI into the theoretical explanations of wage inequality. Di Mauro (2000) argues that one of the major concerns of countries when discussing FDI is the impact of these flows on their labour market, both in terms of employment and wages. FDI influences domestic employment primarily through the: types of jobs created, regional distribution of new employment, wage levels and differentials, income distribution and skill transfers (Mickiewicz et al., 2000) .
FDI is considered one possible channel through which new technology becomes available in the host country and a channel though which a fragmentation of production can take place affecting the demand for skills. Therefore, the impact of FDI on wage inequality can, in part, be analysed by focusing on the effects for skilled versus unskilled labour. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Feenstra (2007) argue that firms in developed countries, abundant with skilled labour, are more likely to outsource their least skill-intensive activities, hence increasing the relative demand and relative wages for these workers in the host countries. However, FDI and outsourcing by multinational companies can also increase the relative demand of skilled workers in the host countries, since what is considered less-skilled labour in developed countries may be considered as skilled labour in developing countries (by local standards). Te Velde (2002) analyses the effects of FDI on the market for skills using a demand-supply framework. Workers are divided into two categories, skilled and unskilled according to education or occupation. The wage of skilled workers relative to the wage of unskilled workers is a measure of wage inequality. As illustrated in Figure 5 , the demand and supply of skilled and unskilled workers depends on relative wages and technology. The relative demand for skilled workers is presented by q D and q S is the relative supply of skills. FDI can shift the demand for skills (q D2 ) in different ways, firstly whether FDI substitutes or complements local employment. For example, if the overall demand for labour rises and this is biased towards skilled employment then labour market competition increases, particularly for skilled workers, suggesting that they pay them higher relative wages (Driffield et al., 2010) . Secondly, FDI may have transferred skillbiased technologies, increasing the productivity of skilled workers, thereby increasing wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, holding other factors constant. However, the speed of this adjustment depends "on the amount of absorptive capacity each country is endowed with. On one hand, if a country is endowed with high absorptive capacity it will be able to shift faster from one stage to the other one. On the other hand, if the transition period is shorter inequality may be a problem only at the beginning when the new technology enters the country" (Franco and Gerussi, 2010, p. 10).
An increased demand for skills will raise the skill premium and offer increased employment opportunities to skilled labour, creating incentives for acquiring skills, as discussed in Snower's model. Foreign-owned firms might also stimulate the supply of skills through creating additional skill vacancies and through investing in training of their workers. Foreign-owned firms can affect the supply of skills (q S2 in Figure 5 ) by offering additional firm-specific and general vocational training, they also typically offer more technical and managerial training for skilled workers (Aitken et al., 1995) . Notwithstanding, this also depends on the size of the foreign-owned firm, industry, entry strategy and motivation for the investment (Te Velde, 2002). Colen et al. (2008) provide an overview of training decisions according to the type/motivation of FDI as follows. Resource or asset-seeking FDI may require specific training for only a small number of high-skilled workers since this is usually a capital-intensive investment using complex extraction methods. Whereas vertical or efficiency-seeking manufacturing FDI usually employs low-skilled, low-wage labour limiting the training possibilities. Market-seeking FDI typically organises technological or marketing training for local people, however only to a limited extent. Market-seeking investment can be also attracted by privatisation of state-owned firms, common in transition countries, which may require substantial training to improve market-orientation skills (Te Velde, 2002), even though transition countries have a relatively skilled/educated workforce.
The engagement of foreign-owned firms in the training of their employees and general investment in education can create spillover effects on local firms. The movement of trained labour from foreign to domestic firms may contribute to the transfer of knowledge of modern production and management practices to their new employers (OECD-ILO, 2008). As a result of these spillover effects domestic-owned firms may improve their labour productivity by imitating the management practices, organisational structures and technology of foreign-owned firms, thus increasing labour market inequality in long run by raising the amount of skilled workers employed. If foreign-owned firms pay higher wages and expand overall employment levels, then this can force domestic-owned firms to raise their own wages "If, however, FDI affects labour demand in the same way as domestic investment, the role of foreign direct investors in transmitting productive knowledge is limited" (Aitken et al., 1995, p.2). Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) use efficiency wage theory to suggest several reasons why foreign-owned firms might pay a higher price for labour. Since foreign-owned firms invest more in training and have technological advantages, they may fear their employees moving to domestic competitors, transferring technological spillovers. To reduce potential labour turnover they may increase the foreign-employer premium. Other reasons might be that foreign-owned firms lack accurate knowledge of the quality of local labour and/or pay higher wages to attract good workers. In addition, more educated/skilled workers are usually in a stronger bargaining position than less-skilled workers because they possess key skills in relatively scarce supply and may have better negotiation skills in acquiring higher wages (Te Velde, 2003) . Thus if foreign-owned firms want to employ 'the best' workers in a given location they will need to pay higher wages. According to OLI framework, MNCs tend to be larger, more capital and skill intensive, introduce more up-to-date technology and pay higher wages accordingly. In addition, institutional factors may provide incentives for foreignowned firms to pay higher wages, for example, in countries where the rule of law is weak, foreign-owned firms "may be more likely to comply with national labour laws, because of reputational concerns and consumer pressure in their home markets" (OECD-ILO, 2008, p.12).
Lipsey (2002) and
In terms of gender equity, foreign-owned firms might pay wage premiums and offer more job security to women relative to domestic-owned firms (Braunstein, 2006) . In contrast, Vijaya and Kaltani (2007) argue increasing the mobility of capital lowers female bargaining power more than male's, since women's options in the market economy are traditionally more limited. In addition, "the potential greater opportunities for skill advancements presented by FDI are more likely to be offered to men, given the perception of their greater productivity vis-à-vis women", which can lead to a rising wage differential between male and females (Vijaya and Kaltani, 2007, p. 87). If FDI is orientated to sectors with a high share of woman in employment and if these sectors are using low-skilled workers such as in the textile industries, FDI might improve opportunities for women and reducing gender pay gap by increasing the demand and hence wages of the less-skilled women in these sectors. However, the discussion of FDI inflows into transition economies in section 2 indicates that labour intensive sectors capture only a small portion of the total FDI in these countries. In addition, if FDI is benefiting the better educated workers it might also improve gender equity since, as Rutkowski (2006) and Pastore and Verashchagina (2011) argue, in many transition countries on average women tend to be better educated than men, even though they are concentrated in low-paid jobs.
In order to bring together the diverse arguments of the effects of FDI on labour market inequality and to investigate the likely effect of increasing foreign ownership on wage inequality, measured by the GINI coefficient, a simulation analysis of wage inequality is presented in the next section. This simulation analysis indicates that the net effects of FDI on wage inequality will depend in part on country specific factors, namely how large are the relative skill wage differences in foreign-owned firms and domestic owned firms, the relative skill-intensity of employment in foreign-owned firms compared to domestic ones and the relative size of the foreign-owned sector.
Simulation analysis of the effects of increased foreign ownership on wage inequality
The GINI coefficient is a common and broadly used measure of wage inequality that can take a minimum value of zero (perfect equality when all individuals have the same amount of wages) and a maximum value of one (the case when one individual of the population holds all wages). Using the GINI coefficient, this simulation analyses the effect of FDI inflows on wage inequality in two parts. Part A, calculates the GINI coefficient for the domestic-owned firm and analyse how the GINI coefficient changes as foreign-owned firms of different types enter a market. Part B replicates the estimations of the first part adjusting the skill differential and employment differential according to PCA (2009) data 11 , where about 10% of employees in Macedonia work for foreign-owned firms. Ignoring any supply-side effects, the net effects of FDI inflows on GINI depends on countries specific effects, namely how large are differences of skilled to unskilled wages, how large is the foreign sector in a country and how large is the employment of skilled versus unskilled workers.
Part A
The GINI coefficients are calculated using the data in Table 5 , where the wage variable is constructed assuming the same wages for all skilled workers (€450) and same wages for all unskilled workers (€100) in the domestic-owned firm. Here the number of skilled and unskilled workers is assumed the same in the three firms, whereas in the fourth firm an employment differential is introduced. In the first foreign-owned firm both wage of skilled and unskilled workers are increased by 100%. In the FOREIGN2 scenario the proportionate skill differential is higher in the foreign-owned firm and the FOREIGN3 scenario keeps the same wages as DOMESTIC1 and increases the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers. Hence, GINI coefficients are calculated using data on average monthly wage of skilled and unskilled workers (columns 1 and 2) in one domestic-owned firm and three foreign-owned firms, weighted by the number of skilled and unskilled employees (columns 3 and 4) in each firm. Table 5 Simulation data on wages and employees on domestic and foreign owned firms Table 6 reports the GINI coefficients first for the domestic-owned firm and then including foreign-owned firms. The average GINI coefficient for the domestic-owned firm (DOM1) is 0.32, increased by 25% when the first foreign-owned firm is included and being the same when adding FOREIGN2. This increase is due to a larger absolute proportionate wage skill differential in the foreign-owned firm. Comparing DOM1 with FOREIGN3 decreases the GINI coefficient to 0.29 due to the employment differential. These results indicate that the overall GINI coefficient may increase as a result of the increased skilled premium, holding other factors constant.
However, if a foreign-owned firm pays local wages (FOREIGN3) but employs a higher proportion of skilled workers, this actually lowers inequality. So there are two effects of foreign-owned firms working in opposite directions, hence there is an ambiguous overall effect of foreign-owned firm's entry on wage inequality. Table 7 . The foreign-owned firms (FOREIGN1) in Macedonia pay 25% wage premium for skilled and 37% for unskilled workers. So, the base GINI coefficient was calculated using DOMESTIC1 and FOREIGN1 data. Afterwards two changes were simulated: 1) what happens to the GINI when a new foreign-owned firm enters with a larger absolute skill wage differential (FOREIGN2) and 2) what happens when a new foreignowned firm enters with the same wage premium as the original foreign-owned firm but with a higher proportion of skilled workers (FOREIGN3). Table 8 To conclude, FDI is not likely to influence wages of all type of workers to the same extent (Te Velde, 2003) . According to the skill-bias argument FDI inflows may have positive effects on domestic skilled wages as a result of the increased 'international' competition for such workers and changes in technology which raise the demand for skilled workers. This changing pattern of demand for labour is likely to have a negative effect on unskilled wages (Onaran and Stockhammer, 2007). The simulation analysis indicates that the effect of FDI inflows on labour market inequality is much more complex than previously assumed in the literature. Increased inflows of FDI could increase or reduce the GINI coefficient dependent upon country-specific factors and the type of FDI. In order to investigate these effects further, empirical research is required.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the increased FDI flows, research into transition countries and especially Western Balkan countries has largely neglected the effects of foreign ownership on labour market inequality. There seems to be a general agreement on the impact of FDI on growth, whereas in relation to labour market inequality further investigation is needed to clarify the situation. As a result of technological and management expertise FDI may improve the level of wages in the host economies as well as working conditions and increase employment. Foreign-owned firms tend to be larger, more capital and skill intensive, introduce more up-to-date technology and pay higher wages accordingly. FDI is not likely to influence wages of all type of workers to the same extent. Using the GINI coefficient as the measure of wage inequality our simulation analysis indicates that the net effects of FDI on wage inequality will depend in part on country specific factors: how large are the differences in skilled and unskilled wages, the skill-intensity of employment in foreign-owned firms compared to domestic ones and the relative size of the foreign-owned sector. This simulation analyses suggest that wage inequality may increase as a result of the increased skill premium, holding other factors constant. However, if a foreign-owned firm pays the same wages as locally-owned firms, but employs a higher proportion of skilled workers, this actually lowers inequality. Hence, there is an ambiguous overall effect of foreign-owned firm's entry on wage inequality.
Analysing the sectoral distribution the services sector accounted for most of inward FDI stock in all SEE countries up to 2012, however with substantial variations among countries. In Macedonia, foreign-owned firms enhanced services, such as in telecommunications and banking, introduced new technologies and machineries, improved export capacities through contract manufacturing and pay higher wages than domestic investors.
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